"We are witnessing the worst humanitarian crisis ever observed".
These are the words of Kristalina Georgieva, the European commissioner in charge of international cooperation, humanitarian help and reaction towards crisis, during her visit to Lebanon in mid-May 2013. 370,000 refugees were then registered with UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees). Today, they are more than 960,000. Over the past 12 months, this represents 13,600 recordings with UNHCR per week, in a country that had only 4 million inhabitants before this massive influx. The Bekaa governorate alone currently hosts nearly 310,000 refugees for an initial population of 750,000 people, that is to say an increase of more than 40% of the total population.
All these figures reflect the impact of the influx of Syrian refugees, barely tolerable for the Lebanese population. All sections of society are adversely affected by the effects of their massive presence that is growing day by day. UNHCR has officially forecasted the number of 1.5 million refugees at the end of 2014.
Macroeconomic impacts of the Syrian conflict on Lebanon
A report by the World Bank estimates the direct losses of the syrian
conflict for the Lebanese economy to more than 7.5 billion dollars: [1]
The conflict profoundly and negatively affects the confidence of
investors and consumers in this insecure and uncertain environment. The
conflict also disturbs Lebanon trading traffic.
The resulting lower economic activity has a downward pressure on
government revenues which, combined with the growing demand for public services
arising from the influx of refugees, is damaging to Lebanon's public finances
already low.
Furthermore, the massive influx of refugees has a strong influence
on the level of economic activity in Lebanon in general, which is reflected in
several areas. Torn between a moral obligation to help their Syrian
brothers who have suffered violent conflict, and the constant burden of their
presence on the Lebanese limited resources, the host communities express a
growing resentment as the presence of refugees lasts in time and as their
number is growing.
The UNHCR figures mentioned above do not include refugees awaiting
registration (almost 50,000), nor the many others who do not wish or do not fit
into the recording criteria of this UN program. If we also add the
300,000 Syrian workers already in Lebanon
before the crisis, we can seriously consider that 1.5 million
Syrians are already in Lebanon today.
Unlike Turkey and Jordan, the Lebanese government has not set up
legal camps for Syrian refugees as he had done for Palestinian refugees in
1948. These hundreds of thousands of refugees are therefore scattered
over an area slightly larger than Cyprus.
Due to the lack of space, the price of land and property was
already high before the refugee crisis. Their massive influx caused a
significant increase in rents, especially in areas that were already
overpopulated such as the Akkar caza in the north. According to
information gathered by the editors of Fafo’s report, the price of an apartment
in the village of Bebnine, for example, went from $ 200 to $450 per month since
the beginning of the Syrian conflict[2].
The massive influx of refugees in the Akkar region has impoverished the local
population in a region that was already in a fragile economic situation before
the Syrian conflict. Particularly strong in this region, this phenomenon
is felt throughout the territory to variable degrees.
Way before the crisis, about 300,000 Syrians were working
low-skilled jobs in Lebanon and thus accounted for 17% of the local workforce [3].
The World Bank estimates that the numerous refugees who arrived in the Lebanese
labor market since the beginning of the crisis could be between 27% and 35% of
the total workforce at the end of 2014 [4].
So even before the crisis, the growth of labor did not follow the
pace of GDP growth. Between 1997 and 2009, GDP growth was on average 3.7%
per year when the increase in labor was only 1.1%. Unemployment had
therefore already increased before the conflict and was about 11%. With
the massive influx of refugees on the labor market, the annual increase in the
unemployment rate has been significantly increased, from 3% in 2012 to 7.9% in
2013. According to the World Bank, the increase could grow in 2014; from 8.8%
in low case scenario to 11.3% in high case:
Considered more competitive for willing to work longer hours per day, Syrian labor is valued by Lebanese employers, especially that it is much less expensive than the Lebanese workforce: $6 vs $15 per day on average for a Syrian farm worker, for example. for the Lebanese, this increased competition for jobs fuels a growing hostility from the latters since it accelerates their impoverishment. According to the survey conducted within the framework of the Fafo report, more than 80% of the Lebanese consider that the refugees are taking their jobs to a large extent [6].
Increased scarcity of hydraulic and electric resources
An obvious paradox lies in Lebanon
regarding water resources; with 1,071 cubic meters per year per inhabitant –
against 240 for its Israeli neighbor– Lebanon is considered as the water tower
in the Middle East. But with a usage rate of the available resources of almost
10% and a loss rate of almost 40%[7],
Lebanon was already at the limit of water stress before the crisis.
The renewable water resources per inhabitant
were already slightly below the scarcity level before the Syrian crisis. With
an increase of more than one fourth of the total population in two years, these
resources are now well below level.
Stress on groundwater is already
significant, mainly because of the large number of private wells dug constantly[8]. Numerous
refugees magnify this phenomenon by digging wells in the camps, leading to
increasing tensions in the neighborhood. Tensions have also increased
when they illegally connect to someone else’s network, thus capturing a rarefying
resource at accelerated speed. Moreover, the very dry winter currently ending
raises fears of a premature shortage situation.
A similar problem exists for electricity, the public network being
largely obsolete, leading to a significant loss. Daily three-hour power cuts in
Beirut, much more elsewhere, have been punctuating the days of the Lebanese for
many years. The sudden increase of 20% in the population therefore exerts
considerable weight on an electrical system that was already in trouble before
the crisis, fueling a growing resentment of the Lebanese towards the refugees.
In conclusion, on March 5th 2014 in Paris, Lebanese
Head of State Michel Sleimane talked, at a meeting opening of the International
Support Group (ISG) in Lebanon, about an “existential threat due to the influx
of Syrian refugees menacing the Lebanese unity”.
The weight of Syrians refugees on the Lebanese society has become
so heavy that it is threatening the whole country. Lebanon has
unfortunately become accustomed to collecting many shocks during its short
history, it may be one too many if the country is not supported more.
[2] Mona Christophersen, Cathrine Moe Thorleifsson and Åge A. Tiltnes, Ambivalent
Hospitality – Coping Strategies and Local Responses to Syrian Refugees in
Lebanon, Fafo, 2013, p. 18 : http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/20338/20338.pdf
[3] World Bank, Lebanon…, op. cit.,
p. 83
[5] World Bank, Lebanon…, op. cit.,
p. 88
[6] Mona Christophersen, Cathrine Moe Thorleifsson and Åge A. Tiltnes, Ambivalent
Hospitality…, p. 42
[8] At least 20,000 illegal harnessing cases were
counted in groundwater only in the regions of Greater Beirut and Mount Lebanon :
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/12/23/water-in-lebanon-matching-myth-with-reality
